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Abstract: This article first offers an examination of the rationale underlying the rule of law 
framework adopted by the Commission in March 2014 before outlining its main features. It is 
argued that while the Commission’s ‘light-touch’ proposal falls short of what is required to 
effectively address internal threats to EU values, it remains preferable to the Council’s alternative 
proposal to hold an annual rule of law dialogue. To make the Commission’s framework more 
workable and effective, which should in turn increase its ‘dissuasive potential’, a number of modest 
recommendations are also offered.  
 




‘[The EU’s] legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that each 
Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises 
that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is 
founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU.’ 
 
European Court of Justice, 18 December 20141 
 
‘The death penalty question should be put on the agenda in Hungary … 
Hungary will stop at nothing when it comes to protecting its citizens.’ 
 
Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, 28 April 20152  
 
 
The rule of law is one of the fundamental values on which the EU is based according to 
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.3 Faced with what has been described as an 
increasing number of ‘rule of law crises’,4 a new framework to strengthen the rule of law 
was put forward by the European Commission in March 2014.5 In doing so, the 
Commission aimed to address situations where ‘a systemic threat to the rule of law’6 may 
be detected within any Member State.7 The publication of the Commission’s rule of law 
                                                 
* Professor of EU Constitutional Law, Groningen; Visiting Professor and LAPA Fellow (2015-2016), 
Princeton University. 
** Jean Monnet Professor of EU Public Law, Middlesex University London. 
1 Opinion 2/13, Accession of the EU to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, para. 168.  
2 I. Traynor, ‘Hungary PM: bring back death penalty and build work camps for immigrants’, The Guardian, 
29 April 2015. 
3 Art. 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights …’ 
4 See e.g. J.M. Barroso, State of the Union 2012 Address, European Parliament, 12 September 2012, 
Speech/12/596. 
5 European Commission Communication, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 
158 Final, 11 March 2014.  
6 Ibid., p. 3. 
7 One should note in passing that the Commission does not address the situation of the Union itself vis-à-vis 
the rule of law. This is not to say that all is well in the best of all possible worlds as far as the EU is 
concerned. For a ‘rule of law audit’ of its constitutional framework, see L. Pech, ‘‘A Union Founded on the 
Rule of Law’: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’, 6 EUConst 
(2010) p. 359. Some of the EU’s most important policies can also be sharply criticised on this ground. See 
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communication was soon followed by the appointment in November 2014 of the First 
Vice-President of the European Commission in charge inter alia of the Rule of Law – a 
position held by Frans Timmermans. This development may be understood as further 
evidence that the issue of EU countries’ compliance with the rule of law has both gained 
salience and will firmly remain on the Commission’s agenda for the foreseeable future. 
This is indeed the first time that a Commissioner has been explicitly tasked to coordinate 
the Commission’s work in the area of the rule of law. It is also worth noting that prior to 
his appointment, Timmermans had welcomed the Commission’s framework on the ground 
that a more systematic approach was required to avoid any ‘rule of law backsliding’ post 
EU accession.8 Soon after Timmermans’ appointment, the Council of the EU decided to 
adopt its own rule of law initiative and committed itself to establishing a political dialogue 
among EU Member States to promote and safeguard the rule of law within the EU.9 
This flurry of initiatives on the rule of law front is yet to lead however to concrete 
actions.10 Indeed, despite a succession of distressing developments in at least one EU 
Member State,11 the Commission is yet to activate its new rule of law framework whose 
rationale (Section 1) and main features (Section 2) are analysed below. This article’s main 
argument is as follows: While the Commission’s ‘light-touch’ framework falls short of 
what is required to effectively address internal threats to EU values (Section 3), it remains 
however eminently preferable to the Council’s alternative proposal to hold an annual rule 
of law dialogue (Section 4). To make the Commission’s rule of law framework more 
workable and effective, which should in turn increase its ‘dissuasive potential’, a number 
of modest recommendations are finally offered (Section 5).  
 
1. The Commission’s Diagnosis  
 
The rationale underlying the Commission’s new mechanism is that the current EU legal 
framework is ill designed when it comes to addressing internal, systemic threats to the rule 
of law and more generally, EU values, as set out in Article 2 TEU. This has become a 
significant issue to the extent that rule of law deviance within the EU appears to have 
gained both on intensity and regularity in the past decade.  
 
1.1 An increasing number of challenges to the rule of law  
 
In a well-noted speech on 4 September 2013, Viviane Reding, former EU Justice 
Commissioner, drew an interesting parallel between Europe’s economic and financial 
crisis and what she viewed as an increasing number of ‘rule of law crises’ revealing 
problems of a systemic nature.12 Three concrete examples were mentioned in her speech:  
                                                                                                                                                    
e.g. C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in 
Europe’s Bailouts’, 35(2) OJLS (2015) 325. The EU’s own adherence to the rule of law will be one of the 
main themes covered by a forthcoming book edited by C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
8 Answers to the European Parliament, Questionnaire to the Commissioner-Designate Frans Timmermans, 
Question 6: <ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/2014-ep-hearings-reply-timmermans_en.pdf>.  
9 Council of the EU, Press release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 16 
December 2014, pp. 20-21 
10 For a critical overview, which usefully complements the present article, see ‘Editorial Comments: 
Safeguarding EU values in the Member States – Is something finally happening’, 52 CMLRev (2015) p. 619. 
11 See most recently, Human Rights Watch, ‘Hungary: Little EU Action on Rights Concerns’, Press Release, 
18 February 2015: <http://www.hrw.org/node/132910>; European Parliament Plenary – Commission 
statement on the situation in Hungary by First Vice-President Timmermans, Strasbourg, 19 May 2015, Press 
release IP/15/5007. 
12 V Reding, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – What next?’, Speech/13/677, 4 September 2013. 
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(i) The French government’s attempt in summer 2010 to secretly implement a collective 
deportation policy aimed at EU citizens of Romani ethnicity despite contrary assurances given 
to the Commission that Roma people were not being singled out;  
(ii) The Hungarian government’s attempt in 2011 to undermine the independence of the judiciary 
by implementing an early mandatory retirement policy; and  
(iii) The Romanian government’s failure to comply with key judgments of the national 
constitutional court in 2012.13  
 
Taken together, these episodes have been often understood as demonstrating the 
increasing number of instances where national authorities consciously sought to 
systematically undermine key EU values such as the rule of law.14 It is indeed clear to us 
that numerous examples of rule of law malfunctioning in the EU, both past15 and 
present,16 could be easily added to this list, making Reding’s case even more compelling. 
The Commission was therefore legitimately right to worry about the ‘threats to the legal 
and democratic fabric in some of our European states’.17 Indeed, a number of European 
governments also expressed concerns regarding what may be more generally labelled rule 
of law backsliding.18 Among many other initiatives, this led eleven Foreign Ministers to 
advocate the introduction of a new, ‘light’ mechanism which would enable the 
Commission to make recommendations or report back to the Council in cases of concrete 
and serious violations of fundamental values or principles such as the rule of law.19  
 
1.2 An inadequate framework to address the challenges to the rule of law 
 
The suggestion to introduce a new mechanism implicitly assumes that the EU’s current 
‘toolbox’ is not adequate to address the previously described challenges.20 Indeed, the 
former President of the European Commission himself called for a ‘better developed set of 
instruments’,21 which would fill the space that exists at present between the Commission’s 
infringement powers laid down in Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, and the so-called ‘nuclear 
option’22 laid down in Article 7 TEU. This diagnosis is, in our view, warranted as both 
procedures suffer from a number of shortcomings, with the consequence that Article 7 
                                                 
13 For further analysis, see respectively, O. Parker, ‘Roma and the Politics of EU Citizenship in France’, 50 
JCMS (2012) p. 475; F. Casolari, ‘Respect for the Rule of Law in a Time of Economic and Financial Crisis: 
The Role of Regional International Organizations in the Hungarian Affaire’, XXIII Italian Yearbook of 
International Law (2013) p. 219; V. Perju, ‘The Romanian Double Executive and the 2012 Constitutional 
Crisis’, 13 I-CON (2015) p. 246. 
14 See generally A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, 
What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’, 51 CMLRev (2014) p. 59. 
15 GN Toggenburg, ‘La crisi austriaca: delicate equilibrismi sospesi tra molte dimensioni’, Diritto pubblico 
comparato ed europeo, 2001, 735; K Lachmayer, ‘The Austrian Crisis’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member State Compliance (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming). 
16 See e.g. M Avbelj, ‘Failed Democracy: The Slovenian Patria Case – (Non)Law in Context’ (originally 
published in Slovenian), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2462613>; B. 
Bugarič, ‘A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in post-Communist Europe: “Lands in-between” Democracy 
and Authoritarianism’, 12 I-CON (2015) p. 219. 
17 J.M. Barroso, State of the Union address 2013, European Parliament, 11 September 2013, Speech/13/684. 
18 J-W. Müller, Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU. Brussels and the Future of the Liberal Order 
(Transatlantic Academy Paper Series 2013). 
19 See final report of the Future of Europe Group (‘Westerwelle report’), 17 September 2012, para. II(d).  
20 For a comprehensive study, see C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and 
Means’, in Closa and Kochenov 2015, supra n. 7.  
21 Barroso, supra n. 17. 
22 Ibid.  
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TEU has never been used whereas the Commission’s infringement powers have proved 
ineffective to remedy systemic violations of EU values.  
 
1.2.1 The ‘Nuclear Option’ 
 
The so-called ‘nuclear option’ is to be found in Article 7 TEU.23 This provision, which was 
first introduced into the EU Treaties by the Amsterdam Treaty, gives the Council of the EU 
the power to sanction any Member State found ‘guilty’ of a serious and persistent breach 
of the EU values laid down in Article 2 TEU. For instance, the Council could deprive the 
relevant Member State of certain of the rights it derives from the EU Treaties, including 
the right to vote on EU legal acts submitted to the Council for adoption. With the Nice 
Treaty, Article 7 TEU was revised to further enable the EU to adopt preventive sanctions 
in the situation where there is ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’ of the EU values by a 
Member State. 
The two scenarios envisioned by Article 7 TEU are not formally linked with each 
other: preventive sanctions do not necessarily have to come first and the same Member 
State could be theoretically sanctioned for a clear risk of a serious breach and/or a serious 
and persistent breach. Furthermore, different procedural requirements govern the two 
scenarios. In both situations, however, these procedural requirements are particularly 
demanding. The determination of whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach requires 
(1) a proposal by one third of the Member States, by the Parliament or the Commission; (2) 
the assent of the Parliament (i.e., a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a 
majority of its members); (3) a majority of four fifths of the Council’s members. As for the 
determination of an existing serious and persistent violation, the same conditions apply 
with two differences: It is for the European Council to act and it must do so by unanimity. 
Even though abstentions do not prevent unanimity to be reached – the country under 
scrutiny cannot for obvious reasons block the decision-making process – the procedural 
requirements make it virtually impossible that the Council would ever be in a position to 
adopt sanctions (e.g. to suspend the voting rights of the Member State in the Council). 
Furthermore, the Council is actually under no legal obligation to do so even in a situation 
where it concludes that a Member States is in breach of Article 2 TEU values. This aspect 
clearly shows the predominant political nature of Article 7 TEU. The case law of the Court 
of Justice has further made clear that no private applicant could force the EU to trigger the 
application of Article 7 TEU.24  
Unsurprisingly, while there have been many calls for activating Article 7 TEU, not 
least when it was revealed that several EU Member States and some candidate countries 
colluded in the running of secret CIA prisons after 9/11,25 this provision has never been 
used for essentially two reasons: the thresholds for activating it, as shown above, are 
virtually impossible to meet, and the existence of a political convention whereby it would 
                                                 
23 For a general ‘official’ introduction, see European Commission Communication, Article 7 of the Treaty 
on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is founded, COM(2003) 
606 final, 15 October 2003. For a more critical study, see W. Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of 
Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’, 16 CJEL (2010) p. 385. 
24 See Case T-337/03, Bertelli Gálvez v Commission [2004] ECR II-1041, para. 15, where the Court of 
Justice held that the EU Treaties – the entry into force of Lisbon does not invalidate this conclusion – did not 
give it jurisdiction to determine whether the EU institutions have acted lawfully to ensure the respect by the 
Member States of the principles laid down under what is now Article 2 TEU or to adjudicate on the 
lawfulness of acts adopted on the basis of what is now Article 7 TEU, save in relation to questions 
concerning the procedural stipulations contained in that article, which the Court may address only at the 
request of the Member State concerned. 
25 ECtHR, 24 July 2014, App. no 28761/11, Al Nashiri v Poland. 
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be politically counterproductive to do so.26 This means that with the sole exception of the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) – an unprecedented rule of law 
monitoring mechanism put in place for Romania and Bulgaria at the time of their accession 
to the EU27 – the European Commission has for the most part relied on political pressure 
and its well-established power to bring infringement actions before the EU Court of 
Justice, to seek changes in the countries which have been found wanting as far as respect 
for EU values is concerned.  
 
1.2.2 The infringement procedure’s limited effectiveness with respect to EU values 
 
Under the rules laid down in Article 258 TFEU, the Commission may initiate an 
infringement action against any Member State, which has failed to comply with its EU 
obligations, and may bring the matter before the Court of Justice should the relevant 
Member State fail to comply with the Commission’s recommendation(s). Any Member 
State failing to comply with the Court’s judgment may, under Article 260 TFEU, be 
brought again before the Court of Justice, which, in this instance, has the additional power 
of imposing financial sanctions on it.28  
The Commission has traditionally claimed that the infringement procedure – and at 
times, the mere threat of using it – has enabled it to score a number of swift successes,29 
which however may be quite legitimately regarded as Pyrrhic victories. Firstly, if the 
French policy regarding the deportation of Roma people was indeed amended after the 
Commission threatened to initiate infringement proceedings,30 it has since been shown 
that the legal measures adopted by France to address the Commission concerns in 2010 
fell short of what is required under EU Law.31 Similarly, while Hungary reviewed its 
legislation following its defeat before the Court of Justice, the Hungarian judges affected 
by the controversial legislation were never reinstated.32 Finally, there are no indications 
that the Romanian constitutional conflict mentioned in Reding’s speech, which came to an 
                                                 
26 It must however be noted that Vice-President Timmermans recently indicated that any reintroduction of 
the death penalty by any Member State, an idea mooted by the Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, would ‘lead 
to the application of Article 7 TEU’. See Commission statement on the situation in Hungary, Strasbourg, 19 
May 2015, Press release IP/15/5007. 
27 For further analysis, see M.A. Vachudova and A. Spendzharova, ‘The EU’s Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession’, SIEPS European Policy 
Analysis, 2012, 1; L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle of EU’s External Action’, CLEER 
Working Paper 2012/3. 
28 For some sobering thoughts on the effectiveness of this mechanism, see P Wennerås, ‘Sanctions against 
Member States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, but not kicking?’, 49 CMLRev (2012) p. 145; B. Jack, 
‘Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?’, 19 ELJ (2013) 
p. 420. 
29 In Reding’s self-congratulatory language, supra n. 12, section 2: ‘[M]easured against the background of 
the role and duty the Commission has been given so far by the Treaties, I consider that the Commission has 
been rather successful in dealing with these often very difficult and complex cases.’ 
30 See European Commission, ‘European Commission assesses recent development in France, discusses 
overall situation of the Roma and EU law on free movement of EU citizens’, Press Release IP/10/1207, 29 
September 2010. 
31 See French Law No. 2011-672 on Immigration, Integration and Nationality enacted on June 17, 2011 and 
the analysis of it by Human Rights Watch, France’s Compliance with the European Free Movement 
Directive and the Removal of Ethnic Roma EU Citizens, 28 September 2011, available at: 
<www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/28/france-s-compliance-european-free-movement-directive-and-removal-
ethnic-roma-eu-citi> 
32 Case C-286/12, Commission v Hungary [2012] (The radical lowering of the retirement age for Hungarian 
judges constitutes unjustified discrimination on grounds of age). More recently, Hungary was found to have 
violated EU law by prematurely bringing to an end the term served by its Data Protection Supervisor: Case 
C-288/12, Commission v Hungary [2014]. 
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apparent end in December 2012 when an agreement was reached between the President 
and the Prime Minister,33 would not have ended in a similar manner regardless of the 
pressure put on Romanian authorities by the Commission. The fact that Romania 
continues to be subject to the specific monitoring mechanism put in place at the time of its 
EU accession also appears to indicate the limits of the Commission’s influence over 
Romanian authorities.34 In any event, it is clear that battles over Article 2 TEU are far 
from being a story of days past. To give one but worrying example, Hungary’s Prime 
Minister recently advocated the establishment of an ‘illiberal state’ and referred to Putin’s 
Russia and Communist China as two possible models to follow.35  
The call for an illiberal regime, which is not pure rhetoric in the context of the 
contemporary Hungarian state,36 plainly flies in the face of Article 2 TEU and yet the 
Commission cannot initiate any infringement action against Hungary on this sole basis. 
Indeed, and strictly speaking, the Commission may only initiate an infringement action 
against a Member State for a specific violation of EU law. This is not to say that Article 2 
TEU should be viewed as a mere political declaration – the Treaties make clear that EU 
institutions as well as EU Member States ought to respect and promote the Union’s 
values.37 It would also be misguided to consider that EU values cannot constitute legal 
principles or that they completely lack legal effect. For instance, the rule of law, as a 
fundamental principle which underlies the whole European legal order, has already been 
used by the European Court of Justice both as a source from which directly actionable 
legal principles can be derived, and as a constitutional norm which should guide the 
interpretation of other legal norms.38 The rule of law, however, is not a rule of law 
actionable before a court. For instance, one cannot directly rely on the EU value of the rule 
of law to seek annulment of the acts of EU institutions.39 More generally speaking, Article 
2 TEU cannot be a cause of judicial action in and of itself. In other words, because of the 
relatively open-ended nature of the values laid down in Article 2 TEU, this provision lacks 
justiciability. In procedural terms, this means that no legal proceedings against any EU 
country can be brought on this sole legal basis, either before national or EU courts. As far 
as internal threats to or breach of EU values are concerned, Article 2 TEU may instead be 
said to rather complement the so-called ‘nuclear option’ previously analysed. Indeed 
Article 7 TEU does refer explicitly to the values laid down in Article 2 TEU and to that 
extent, it may be argued that Article 2 TEU comes within the lex specialis of Article 7 
                                                 
33 For some recent studies, see chapters 5 and 6 in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional 
Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart, 2015). 
34 For the argument that the EU is not necessarily powerless against democratic backsliding in Romania 
provided that the right constellation of conditions for both social and material pressure exists, see U. 
Sedelmeier, ‘Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in 
Hungary and Romania after Accession’, 52 JCMS (2014) p. 105.    
35 ‘We are parting ways with western European dogmas, making ourselves independent from them … We 
have to abandon liberal methods and principles of organising a society. The new state that we are building is 
an illiberal state, a non-liberal state,’ cited in I. Traynor, ‘Budapest autumn: hollowing out democracy on the 
edge of Europe’, The Guardian, 29 October 2014. 
36 See K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Unconstitutional Constitution’, New York Times, 2 January 2012. For an article 
looking beyond Hungary, see J.-W. Müller, ‘Eastern Europe Goes South. Disappearing Democracy in the 
EU’s Newest Members’, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2014. 
37 See Articles 3(1) and 13 TEU as far as the EU is concerned and Articles 4(3) and 7 TEU as far as the 
Member States are concerned. For the argument that the EU values entail more obligations and guidance for 
the exercise of EU powers post Lisbon Treaty, see J. Larik, ‘From Speciality to a Constitutional Sense of 
Purpose: On the Changing Role of the Objectives of the EU’, 62 ICLQ (2014) p. 935.  
38 For extensive references, see L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European 
Union’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 04/09. 
39 Art. 263 TFEU. 
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TEU and as such, cannot be used to trigger legal actions outside of this framework. In 
other words, Article 2 TEU cannot be relied upon by the Commission to initiate an 
infringement action under Article 258 TFEU.  
The Commission is thus left with one legal option when it comes to dealing with 
what may be viewed as national breaches of EU values: pursuing individual instances 
where national authorities do not implement or correctly apply specific provisions of EU 
law. No infringement action would however be possible regarding areas not governed by 
EU law or in the situation where the national violation of EU values is of a political and 
diffuse nature. This meant, for instance, that in the absence of any general EU legislative 
competence over the independence and impartiality of national judiciaries, the 
Commission had no choice but to rely on the EU principle of non-discrimination on the 
ground of age to challenge Hungary’s legislation regarding the compulsory retirement of 
judges. The limited scope of the Commission’s legal challenge did not unfortunately allow 
it to impose effective remedies that would have prevented the undermining of the 
independence and impartiality of Hungarian’s judicial system by the national 
government.40 And while the scope of Article 7 TEU is not confined to the areas regulated 
by EU law but also allows the Union to act in the event of a breach in which Member 
States act autonomously, i.e., in their own exclusive areas of competence, this provision, as 
previously noted, has been understood as a ‘nuclear option’ which is there to deter and not 
to be used, save an extreme situation such as a coup d’Etat.  
This leaves the EU with an extremely limited set of legal tools to address systemic 
violations of EU values at national level. This is a particularly problematic for a number of 
important reasons, which one may summarise as follows: Where a country experiences 
‘constitutional capture’ by illiberal forces,41 i.e. a government’s systematic weakening of 
checks and balances, or is governed by elected officials whose official programme is the 
dismantlement of the liberal democratic state, these violations of EU values do not simply 
affect the citizens of the relevant Member State.42 They also affect EU citizens residing in 
that country as well as all EU citizens through this country’s participation in the EU’s 
decision-making process and the adoption of norms that bind all in the EU. Europe’s 
regulatory and judicial interconnected space is also built on the principle of mutual trust43 
and an absolute requirement of mutual recognition of judicial decisions,44 which can hardly 
survive when one national system ceases to be governed by the rule of law. In addition to 
these negative externalities, any country disregarding the rule of law threatens the exercise 
of the rights granted to all EU citizens regardless of where they reside in the EU.45 Finally, 
the legitimacy and credibility of the EU are both undermined when it ceases to be able to 
                                                 
40 Only a handful of retired judges were restored in office, none to acquire the administrative position within 
the court structure previously held, and most were simply offered financial compensation. See K.L. 
Scheppele, ‘Making Infringement Procedures More Effective’, EUTopia Law, 29 April 2014, available at: 
<www.eutopialaw.com>. 
41 Müller, supra n. 18. 
42 C. Closa, D. Kochenov, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, EUI 
Working Papers RSCAS 2014/25. 
43 According to the Court of Justice, the EU’s ‘legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that each 
Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of 
common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premiss implies and justifies 
the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, 
that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected’, Opinion 2/13, Accession to the ECHR (II), 18 
December 2014, para. 168.  
44 Art. 67 TFEU.  
45 For further analysis, see C. Closa, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law: Normative Arguments, 
Institutional Proposals, and Procedural Limitations’, in Closa and Kochenov, supra n. 7. 
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guarantee internal compliance with the values it has sought – with relative success46 – to 
uphold and promote in its external relations. 
The Commission therefore had a point when it noted that ‘the confidence of all EU 
citizens and national authorities in the legal systems of all other Member States is vital for 
the functioning of the whole EU’.47 This, in turn, plainly justifies an increased monitoring 
and policing of EU Member States by the EU itself and this was indeed precisely the aim 
of the new framework adopted by the Commission in March 2014.  
 
2. The Commission’s new framework to strengthen the rule of law  
 
In a nutshell, the Commission’s so-called new framework to strengthen the rule of law 
takes the form of an early warning tool whose primary purpose is to enable the 
Commission to enter into a structured dialogue with the Member State concerned to 
prevent the escalation of systemic threats to the rule of law. This procedure is supposed to 
precede the eventual triggering of the ‘nuclear option’ laid down in Article 7 TEU. The 
Commission has also made clear that its framework should not be understood as 
preventing the concurrent launch of infringement actions against the relevant Member 
State where specific violations of EU law can be identified.  
 
2.1 Triggering factors 
 
Before describing how the new ‘rule of law dialogue’ is supposed to work in practice, one 
must note the Communication’s emphasis on the notion of ‘systemic threat’. It would be 
wrong therefore to assume that the Commission sought to gain a new power to examine 
individual breaches of fundamental rights or routine miscarriages of justice via its new rule 
of law framework. Rather, the Commission merely sought to gain a new, additional tool to 
address threats to the rule of law ‘which are of a systemic nature’.48  
As a preliminary point, the Commission sensibly attempts to offer a working 
definition of the notion of the rule of law. In a similar fashion to a study previously 
adopted by the Venice Commission,49 the European Commission’s Communication 
reflects the view that there is now a consensus on the core meaning of the rule of law and 
that this concept essentially entails compliance with the following six legal principles:50  
 
1) 
Legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and 
pluralistic process for enacting laws; 
2) Legal certainty; 
3) Prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; 
4) Independent and impartial courts; 
5) Effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; 
6) Equality before the law. 
                                                 
46 For a skeptical and recent account, see D. Kochenov, ‘Law Perspective: Praise Undeserved? The EU as a 
Democracy Promoter: A Sceptical Account’, in A. Wetzel and J. Orbie (eds.), The Substance of EU 
Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) p. 27. 
47 Commission Communication, supra n. 5, p. 4.  
48 Ibid., p. 7. 
49 Report on the Rule of Law, Study No. 512/2009, CDL-AD(2011)003rev, Strasbourg, 4 April 2011, para. 
35. 
50 Commission Communication, supra n. 5, p. 4.  
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While the European Commission did accept that ‘the precise content of the principles and 
standards stemming from the rule of law may vary at national level, depending on each 
Member State’s constitutional system’,51 it also suggested, rightly in our view, that the six 
elements previously listed stem from the constitutional traditions common to most 
European legal systems and may be said to define the core meaning of the rule of law 
within the context of the EU legal order. This is not to say that some minor criticism is not 
warranted. For instance, it is difficult to understand why the principle of equality before the 
law is distinguished from the broader notion of fundamental rights, which may be thought 
to necessarily include it. Three additional sub-components are also arguably missing from 
the Commission’s list: The principle of accessibility of the law, which requires that the law 
must be intelligible, clear, predictable and published, the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectations and the principle of proportionality. The principle of legality may 
however be understood as encompassing the requirement that the law must be accessible 
and the protection of legitimate expectations is closely linked to the principle of legal 
certainty. As for the principle of proportionality, its limited use in English administrative 
law may have led to its exclusion from what has been presented as a consensual list.  
Be that as it may, two additional important points are made by the European 
Commission: the rule of law must be understood as a ‘constitutional principle with both 
formal and substantive components’ and it is also one which ‘is intrinsically linked to 
respect for democracy and for fundamental rights.’52 It is submitted that the Commission’s 
assessment accurately reflects the dominant understanding of the rule of law in Europe 
and that these two aspects could be viewed as the essential characteristics of what may be 
termed Europe’s rule of law approach.53 In other words, most national legal systems in 
Europe do reveal a broad conception of the rule of law, which requires compliance with 
formal/procedural as well as substantive/material standards. The EU and the Council of 
Europe similarly promote a conception that is not indifferent to the content or the 
substantive aims of the law and which encompasses elements of political morality such as 
democracy and substantive individual rights.54  
While the Commission’s understanding of the rule of law is clearly outlined, which 
should help in turn other EU institutions when and if they have to decide on the 
materiality of a national breach in this area, the notion of threat of a ‘systemic nature’55 is 
by contrast not made particularly clear.56 It is only stated that this type of threat may result 
from ‘the adoption of new measures or of widespread practices of public authorities and 
the lack of domestic redress.’57 In this context, the Commission Communication’s 
references to the case law of the Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human 
Rights are unhelpful and largely off-point.58 There is also a degree of confusion between 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 See generally Pech (2009), supra n. 38. 
54 L. Pech, ‘Promoting The Rule of Law Abroad: On the EU’s limited contribution to the shaping of an 
international understanding of the rule of law’ in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The EU’s Shaping 
of the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 108. 
55 Commission Communication, supra n. 5, p. 7.  
56 For an attempt to clarify what a ‘systemic deficiency’ in the rule of law may entail, see von Bogdandy and 
M. Ioannidis, supra n. 14, p. 65. 
57 Commission Communication, supra n. 5, p. 7. 
58 For instance, the ECHR concept of systemic or structural problem seems broader and different in nature 
than the concept of systemic threat. To take a single example, Greece’s asylum system may reveal a systemic 
problem but this does not make it a systemic threat in the absence of any deliberate attempt to undermine the 
rule of law and may more prosaically reflect a general state failure to properly manage its resources and 
enforce national and EU policies.  
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the notions of systemic threat and systemic violation, which is crucial in the context of the 
proposal. It is for instance difficult to understand if this new recourse to the notion of 
systemic threat is meant to signal a different substantive test or whether it should simply 
be understood as broadly synonymous with the notion of ‘serious and persistent breach’ 
currently mentioned by Article 7 TEU. This is an important issue as the Commission’s 
proposed mechanism has been described as a new pre-Article 7 TEU procedure as will be 
shown below. One may finally note that despite Barroso’s call to address serious and 
systemic threats to the rule of law,59 the Commission’s communication does not explicitly 
mention ‘serious’ as a criterion to trigger the new proposed mechanism. Similarly, there 
are no signs of the pre-defined benchmarks promised by Barroso, prior to the publication 
of the Commission’s Communication and on the basis of which this new mechanism was 
supposed to be triggered.60  
 
2.2 A new pre-Article 7 TEU procedure 
 
With respect the mechanics of what the EU Justice Commissioner has described as a new 
‘pre-Article 7 procedure’,61 it is important to distinguish between three main procedural 
stages, which are supposed to be governed themselves by three key principles.  
The three procedural stages involve assessment, recommendation, and follow-up by 
the Commission. They may be described as follows. In the assessment phase, the 
Commission assesses whether there are clear preliminary indications of a systemic threat to 
the rule of law in a particular Member State and send a ‘rule of law opinion’ to the 
government of this Member State should it be of the opinion that there are. In a situation 
where no appropriate actions are taken, the recommendation phase is supposed to 
commence: a ‘rule of law recommendation’ may be addressed to the authorities of this 
country, with the option of including specific indications on ways and measures to resolve 
the situation within a prescribed deadline. The Commission’s follow-up consists of the 
Commission’s monitoring of how the relevant Member State is implementing the 
recommendation mentioned above. Should there be no satisfactory implementation, the 
Commission would then have the possibility – not the obligation – to trigger the 
application of Article 7 TEU.  
Throughout the whole process, three fundamental principles are in play. Firstly, 
only systemic threats or violations of the rule of law may trigger the activation of this new 
mechanism, not minor or individual breaches. Secondly, unlike the current rule of law 
monitoring tool specifically developed for Romania and Bulgaria, this new procedure is 
supposed to apply equally to all Member States, regardless of the date of entry into the 
EU, size, and so forth. Thirdly, while the Commission continues to remain the guardian of 
EU values, third party and/or external expertise may be sought when necessary. The EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the Council of Europe (in particular, the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law also known as the Venice Commission) and 
judicial networks such as the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of 
the EU may therefore be asked to provide expert knowledge, notably during the 
assessment phase.  
                                                 
59 Barroso, supra n. 17. The new framework ‘should be based on the principle of equality between member 
states, activated only in situations where there is a serious, systemic risk to the rule of law, and triggered by 
pre-defined benchmarks’. 
60 Ibid. 
61 V. Reding, ‘A new Rule of Law initiative’, Press Conference, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 11 March 
2014. 
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According to the Commission itself, this new framework is based on its current 
powers as provided for by existing EU Treaties,62 and would merely complement existing 
instruments, notably the Article 7 procedure and the infringement procedure laid down in 
Article 258 TFEU. However, this assessment is not unanimously shared. To give a single 
example, the Council’s legal service has expressed its opposition to the Commission’s 
proposal, alleging, to oversimplify, an unlawful power-grab by the Commission.63 As will 
be shown below, while this may well be considered an extremely significant and highly 
damaging assertion, it is only one of the arguments that have been raised against the 
Commissions’ rule of law framework, the most significant of which will be reviewed 
below. 
 
3. Strong and weak features of the Commission’s proposal 
 
Before offering a critical overview of Commission’s proposal, a number of positive 
features will be highlighted, focusing on points relating to substance, competence, and 
procedure.  
 
3.1. Positive substantive features  
 
The Commission should first be commended for adopting, as discussed above, a reliable 
sketch of the core meaning of the rule of law and the main elements contained within it. 
This was by no means an easy task considering the multiple and at times, conflicting and 
problematic definitions of the rule of law which one may easily encounter in academic 
scholarship.64 The Commission’s main concrete proposition also departs from the most 
widely discussed proposals that have been made prior to the publication of its 
communication, mostly by EU scholars. Before briefly explaining why the Commission 
was for the most part wise to do so, a succinct overview of these proposals is in order. In a 
nutshell, the proposals in question come down to the following key features:  
 
(i) Compulsory exit: It has been suggested that the EU Treaties should be amended to 
give the EU the power to force a chronically non-compliant EU Member State out whereas 
the EU Treaties only currently foresee voluntary withdrawal from the Union;65 
 
(ii) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a federal standard: According to this 
proposal defended by the former EU Justice Commissioner, Article 51(1) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides that its provisions only bind national 
authorities when they are implementing EU law,66 should be repealed so as to make all EU 
fundamental rights ‘directly applicable in the Member States, including the right to 
effective judicial review’;67 
 
                                                 
62 Commission Communication, supra n. 5, p. 9.  
63 Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service 10296/14, 14 May 2014. 
64 For further analysis and references, see Pech (2009), supra n. 38.  
65 Closa et al., supra n. 42, p. 30.  
66 For a critique of this provision, see X. Groussot, L. Pech, and G. Petursson, ‘The Reach of EU 
Fundamental Rights on Member State Action after Lisbon’ in de Vries, Bernitz and Weatherhill (eds.), The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after Lisbon (Hart 2013) p. 97. 
67 Reding, supra n. 12. On the controversial possibility of relying on the EU Charter in national disputes 
falling outside the scope of EU Law, see A. Jakab ‘Supremacy of the EU Charter in National Courts in 
Purely Domestic Cases’ in Jakab and Kochenov, supra n. 15. 
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(iii) Enabling EU jurisdiction via EU citizenship rights: First hinted at by Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro in Centro Europa,68 this proposal essentially suggested to allow 
national courts, in a situation where fundamental rights of EU citizens would be 
systemically violated, to invite the Court of Justice to review the legality of national 
actions in the light of Article 2 TEU notwithstanding the fact that these violations may 
occur in wholly internal situations from a legal point of view, that is, outside the scope of 
application of EU law;69 
 
(iv)  ‘Outsourcing’ of EU values’ monitoring: The President of the Venice 
Commission has proposed to delegate the task of monitoring of EU countries’ adherence to 
the rule of law to his organisation on the ground that it has a solid-track record when it 
comes to assessing and offering solutions to rule of law related problems in the 47 
contracting parties to the Council of Europe;70 
 
(v) Creation of a new EU institution: Closely related to the previous proposal but in 
opposition to the idea of externalising any monitoring tasks and/or sanctioning powers, the 
setting up of a ‘Copenhagen Commission’71 has been suggested with the view of 
subjecting current EU Member States to a similar level of monitoring than EU candidates 
countries while removing this task from the European Commission as it would have failed 
in this endeavour;  
 
(vi)  New application of the existing infringement procedure: Under this proposal, the 
Commission should aim to present a ‘bundle’ of infringement cases to the Court of Justice 
in order to present a clear picture of systemic non-compliance as regards Article 2 TEU 
and gain the additional power to subtract any EU funds that the relevant Member State 
may have been be entitled to receive;72 
 
(vii) Peer-review: Finally, mutual peer-review of each EU country’s adherence to the 
rule of law on the basis of periodic reports to be assessed by national governmental 
representatives has also been suggested.73  
 
None of the above-mentioned proposals is flawless.74 Those requiring Treaty change, like 
the compulsory exit one, are not politically realistic. Similarly, enabling litigants to rely on 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in any situation would be difficult to reconcile with 
                                                 
68 Case C-380/05, Centro Europa [2008] ECR I-349, Opinion of AG Maduro. 
69 A. von Bogdandy et al., ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States’, 49 CMLRev (2012) p. 489. 
70 G. Buquicchio, President of the Venice Commission, Speech at the Assises de la justice, 21 November 
2013. For a contribution by the Finnish representative at the Venice Commission on this topic, see K. Tuori, 
‘From Copenhagen to Venice’, in Closa and Kochenov, supra n. 7. 
71 J.-W. Müller, ‘Should the EU protect democracy and the rule of law inside Member States?’, 21(2) ELJ 
(2015) p. 141. 
72 K.L. Scheppele, ‘What Can the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic Principles 
of the EUuropean Union? The Case for Systematic Infringement Actions’, contribution no. 45 at the Assises 
de la Justice 2013: <ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/contributions_en.htm>, visited 1 June 
2015. 
73 See the Report prepared by E. Hirsch Ballin et al. for the Adviesraad Internationale Vragstukken (AIV), 
‘The Rule of Law: Safeguard for European Citizens and Foundation for European Cooperation’, Report No. 
87, 2014, 35. From the same author, see also ‘Mutual Trust: The Virtue of Reciprocity. Strengthening the 
Acceptance of the Rule of Law through Peer Review’, in Closa and Kochenov, supra n. 7. 
74 For further analysis, see Closa, Kochenov, Weiler, supra n. 42. See also D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing 
Article 2 TEU Compliance’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law (2014) p. 145. 
To be published in the European Constitutional Law Review Vol 11(3) 2015 13 
the principle whereby the EU is an organisation ‘on which the Member States confer 
competences to attain objectives they have in common based on conferred powers’.75 
Allowing the Commission and the Court to exercise broad discretion in bundling violations 
to demonstrate a breach of Article 2 TEU (even if such a breach is found to exist in 
conjunction with other provisions) would also most likely be seen as legally threatening 
and politically unacceptable by national governments. 
Less intrusive proposals are also potentially problematic. The creation of a new EU 
monitoring body would add another layer of bureaucracy whereas the Commission and/or 
the FRA could potentially improve their monitoring capacities provided that they are given 
the resources, and in the case of the FRA, a clear mandate to do so.76 By the same token, 
those who believe that the Commission and the FRA may not be in the position to deliver 
could be too optimistic to assume that a newly created EU body would necessarily be more 
capable. As far as the outsourcing of rule of law monitoring is concerned, this avenue may 
seriously undermine the EU’s understanding of itself as a mature autonomous 
constitutional system if the very heart of what it is about – the key values it adheres to, 
promotes, and is based on – is outsourced to a different organisation such as the Venice 
Commission, however attractive this solution may sound considering the good reputation 
of the Council of Europe’s advisory body.77 
The key issue in any event is less monitoring than enforcement. This is why the 
externalisation of EU Member States’ adherence to the rule of law to Council of Europe’s 
bodies is not a particularly promising avenue. In fact, enforcement is the weak spot of all 
the academic proposals on the table. To put it in a rather informal manner, one does not 
bring about the rule of law by kicking out a Member State that seems to follow a 
dangerous path irreconcilable with its EU membership. The same applies to allowing the 
courts of that Member State to send more questions to the Court of Justice or merely 
enabling the Commission to impose financial sanctions on the ‘rogue state’, which is part 
of what the system infringement proposal is about. In a situation where some states are by 
definition non-compliant, new avenues of safeguarding EU values are indispensable. 
In this context, the refinement of the EU’s current infringement proceedings and 
enhancement of the Commission’s sanctioning powers may be viewed as the most 
seducing proposal. Undertaking a change of this nature without first amending the Treaties 
would however be controversial and possibly unlawful. Viewed in this light, one may 
understand better why the Commission decided to put forward an eminently ‘light touch’ 
mechanism which builds on and complements an already existing – albeit never used – 
procedure. By avoiding Treaty change, the Commission sensibly avoided a situation akin 
to asking turkeys to vote for Christmas. The Commission’s pre-Article 7 procedure also 
suggests that the Commission is well aware of the need to tread carefully in this area since 
the Union, as a democratic constitutional system, is currently not mature enough to move 
into the highly sensitive business of enforcing relatively open-ended and contested values 
against reluctant national authorities.  
 
3.2 Positive features from a competence point of view 
 
                                                 
75 Art. 1 TEU.  
76 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven 
Practical Pointers’, in Closa and Kochenov, supra n. 7. 
77 The effectiveness of the Venice Commission’s working methods and its ability to identify and review 
countries’ adherence to miminum European constitutional standards may however be questioned. See M. de 
Visser, ‘A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice Commission in Processes of Domestic Legal 
Reform’, American Journal of Comparative Law (2015, forthcoming).  
To be published in the European Constitutional Law Review Vol 11(3) 2015 14 
The Commission’s new procedure may therefore be reasonably described as anything but 
revolutionary. In essence it merely requires any ‘suspected’ Member State to engage in a 
mere dialogue with no new, automatic or direct legal consequences should the Member 
State fail to agree with any of the recommendations previously adopted by the 
Commission. It is difficult therefore to understand the criticism whereby the Commission’s 
pre-Article 7 framework would not be ‘compatible with the principle of conferral which 
governs the competences of the institutions of the Union’.78 Similarly, one may remain 
unconvinced by the additional argument that only the Member States – and not even the 
Council – could establish, via an intergovernmental agreement supplementing the EU 
Treaties, ‘a review system of the functioning of the rule of law in the Member States’,79 
which would reflect a ‘peer review approach’ without any compulsory involvement of the 
EU institutions unless the Council, i.e., the national governments, decide otherwise.   
One may be forgiven for finding the opinion of Council’s legal service both 
unpersuasive and ill reasoned. As a preliminary point, we believe that the Commission, 
being one of the institutions empowered, under Article 7 TEU, to trigger the procedure 
contained therein, should in fact be commended for having established clear guidelines on 
how such triggering is to function in practice. Furthermore, a strong and convincing 
argument can be made that Article 7(1) TEU already implicitly empowers the Commission 
to investigate any potential risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values by giving it the 
competence to submit a reasoned proposal to the Council should the Commission be of the 
view that Article 7 TEU ought to be triggered on this basis.80 It may therefore be 
compellingly argued that Article 7 TEU already allows the monitoring of EU Member 
States prior to the determination of a serious breach of EU values given the obvious need 
for the Council to be able to rely on solid factual evidence before eventually finding 
against a ‘rogue state’. In other words, it may be submitted that the powers of monitoring 
Member States with respect to Article 2 TEU values are inherent in the powers of the 
Council and the right of initiative of the Parliament, Commission and Member States under 
Article 7 TEU.81 One should finally recall that the European Commission said as much in 
2003 in its Communication on Article 7 TEU without the Council expressing any objection 
then.82  
 To the extent that the new pre-Article 7 procedure exists to make possible the 
activation of Article 7 TEU – and it would not have been called pre-Article 7 procedure 
otherwise – and that Article 7 makes clear that the Commission may submit a reasoned 
proposal to the Council to enable it to adopt recommendations prior to the determination of 
a clear risk of a serious breach of EU values – a task which could hardly be fulfilled 
without some monitoring framework – it may therefore be reasonably concluded that the 
Commission did not breach the principle of conferred powers when it adopted this new 
                                                 
78 Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service 10296/14, 14 May 2014, para. 28. 
According to the principle of conferred powers, which is laid down in Article 5(2) TEU, ‘the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.’ 
79 Opinion of the Legal Service, ibid., para. 26.  
80 Such a reading is fully in line with the Commission’s practice with respect to Article 49 TEU, which 
governs accession to the EU. In this context, the Commission regularly adopts ‘monitoring’ reports in which 
EU candidate countries’ progress and alignment with the EU acquis, including compliance with EU values, 
are reviewed. See D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (Kluwer 2008) Ch 2. 
81 This argument is borrowed from L. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the 
Rule of Law Initiatives’, in Closa and Kochenov, supra n. 7.  
82 COM(2003) 606 final, pp. 7-8: Article 7 TEU ‘places the institutions under an obligation to maintain 
constant surveillance’ and ‘requires practical operational measures to ensure thorough and effective 
monitoring of respect for and promotion of common values’.  
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procedure in March 2014 as it had already implicitly but necessarily be empowered to 
monitor national compliance with the rule of law under Article 7 TEU. This interpretation 
is further confirmed by the repeated requests made by the Council to the Commission to 
develop assessment tools as regards national compliance with Article 2 TEU values.83  
Moreover, given the overwhelming level of political, legal and economic 
interdependence between the EU Member States, the principles of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition of judgments which underlie the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
as a whole – not to mention the blatant, continuing disregard for EU values in at least one 
EU country – the Commission, if anything, fulfilled (or at least attempted to fulfil) its duty 
as Guardian of the Treaties84 by putting forward a framework that would make Article 2 
TEU more operational in practice. As noted previously, the Court of Justice recently 
reaffirmed, in the strongest possible terms, that the EU’s ‘legal structure is based on the 
fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and 
recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as 
stated in Article 2 TEU.’85 This could be logically construed as necessarily implying not 
only the right but also a duty on EU institutions, in the absence of any possibility to force a 
Member State out of the Union, to safeguard the EU’s ‘constitutional settlement through 
intervention within Member States.’86  
 
3.3 Positive procedural features 
 
On the procedural plane, the key strength of the Commission’s framework is that it could 
be easily deployed alongside other well-established procedures such as the infringement 
procedure laid down in Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. The Commission’s pre-Article 7 
procedure may indeed be understood as an attempt to bridge – albeit rather rudimentarily – 
the gap currently existing between the main form of action for ‘standard’ and specific 
violations of EU law and the main procedure dedicated to ‘exceptional’ and systemic 
violations of EU values laid down in Article 7 TEU. In this sense, the Commission’s 
proposal is reminiscent of some of the academic proposals listed above, as it attempts to 
build a new soft system of enforcing EU values on recalcitrant national authorities 
alongside the long-established procedure dedicated to guaranteeing the application of EU 
law sensu stricto.  
Procedurally speaking, another positive aspect of the Commission’s proposal lies in 
the obvious readiness of the Commission to consult a wide range of expert bodies. The 
FRA, the Venice Commission and other bodies as well as NGOs and think tanks are all 
explicitly mentioned. This is to be welcomed. It was indeed important to avoid duplication 
by taking into account the work already done by EU bodies such as the FRA as well as 
bodies from the Council of Europe and the UN.87 The Commission’s clear willingness to 
rely on third parties’ expertise should not only enhance the proposal’s likely effectiveness 
but also avoids the potential shortcomings of any outright outsourcing of EU problems 
which would in all likelihood further undermine the authority of EU institutions and 
                                                 
83 See e.g. Council conclusions on fundamental rights and the rule of law, Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting, 6 and 7 June 2013, para. 9, where the Council called on the Commission among other things to 
make full use of existing mechanisms to better safeguard EU values.   
84 See Art. 17(1) TEU: ‘The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties…’ 
85 Opinion 2/13, Accession to the ECHR (II), 18 December 2014, para. 168.  
86 Müller 2015, supra n. 71, p. 145.  
87 This was one of the many sensible recommendations contained in a report published by the Bingham 
Centre for the Rule of Law, Safeguarding the Rule of Law, Democracy and Fundamental Rights: A 
Monitoring Model for the European Union, 15 November 2013.  
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citizens’ confidence in them. This is why it would seem more appropriate to rely, for 
instance, on the expertise of the Venice Commission to assess, on a case-by-case basis, the 
reality of any potential breach of the rule of law in any EU Member State while 
maintaining any enforcement-related procedure ‘in-house’. While consultation is welcome, 
the task of guaranteeing compliance with the core values of EU constitutionalism should 
not depend on non-EU bodies and the proposal of the Commission, in this regard, is well 
thought and sensibly designed. 
To conclude on the positive aspects of the Commission’s rule of law framework, 
the suggested ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’ wisely navigates the potential traps related to the 
substance of the concept of the rule of law. It is further designed in such a way that it can 
be implemented without going through an extremely time consuming Treaty amendment 
process with no guarantee of any ‘happy ending’. Finally, it enables the Commission to 
avail of other EU and non-EU bodies’ expertise to build a case against any EU Member 
State while allowing the Commission to complement its well-established power to initiate 
infringement actions against national authorities with a new procedure that should allow it 
to simultaneously investigate systemic violations of EU law.    
 
3.4 Weak features  
 
The Commission’s pre-Article 7 procedure seems to be well designed until one begins 
examining how effective it would be at remedying the diagnosis it reflects. It is in the 
context of the proposal’s effectiveness that the main weakness of the proposal lies, 
potentially annihilating all of the positive points previously highlighted.   
To begin with, the framework is based on the presumption that a discursive 
approach, that is, a dialogue between the Commission and the Member State possibly in 
breach of Article 2 TEU is bound to produce positive results. The validity of this 
presumption is questionable. Indeed, once we move towards really problematic cases, i.e. 
the countries where the ruling élite has made a conscious choice not to comply with EU 
values, then a totally different picture emerges. If such a conscious choice has been made, 
socialisation in the framework of a new pre-Article 7 TEU procedure is unlikely to bring 
about any meaningful change and an end to any systemic attempt to breach EU values in 
the relevant Member State.  
A number of additional shortcomings can be highlighted. First of all, the 
Commission has failed to clarify how it understands the notion of ‘systemic threat’. This is 
however a crucial point as the triggering of the new procedure depends on the presence of 
systemic threats of the rule of law rather than minor or individual breaches. The 
Commission should therefore ‘clearly define the concept of “systemic threat” vis-à-vis 
both isolated violations on the one end of the scale and systemic violations on the other 
end, and to be prepared to take action at an early stage.’88 In this context, yet another 
possible point of criticism comes to light: the Commission’s failure to offer any clear 
distinction between a systemic threat and a systemic violation. One would however hope 
that systemic violations of the rule of law should more easily trigger the new procedure 
than systemic threats, which could be more diffuse and harder to quantify in practice. 
When one adds to the picture the absence of any clearly pre-defined benchmarks – despite 
contrary assurances by former Commission President Barroso – it becomes clear that the 
Commission’s new procedure may end up as unworkable as Article 7 TEU with which it is 
intimately connected. The Commission’s decision to reserve for itself the power to trigger 
                                                 
88 Meijers Committee, Letter to Commissioner Reding: Note on the Commission Communication “A new 
EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”, Ref. CM1406, 15 June 2014, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jun/eu-meijers-cttee-letter-reding-rule-of-law.pdf   
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the pre-Article 7 TEU procedure further sends a mixed message, especially given the 
flexible and not strictly legal character of the procedure. Indeed, it suggests that the 
Commission is keen to preserve an absolute discretionary power to decide when any 
particular Member State ought to be assessed. It would have been more politically astute 
and more effective to grant other EU institutions or national governments and/or national 
parliaments the right to oblige the Commission to investigate any EU Member State, which 
would still have left the Commission with the complete discretion to decide whether there 
is or not a risk of a systemic breach of the rule of law.  
Leaving aside the uncertainties surrounding the triggering the Commission’s 
procedure, one may furthermore regret some key procedural elements that are likely to 
further prevent a meaningful and effective enforcement of EU values. The confidential 
nature of the whole discussion to be held between the Commission and the Member State 
under investigation will prevent a ‘name-and-shame’ environment from crystallising, a 
feature which would most likely add significantly to the effectiveness of the procedure. 
The non-legally binding nature of the ‘rule of law recommendation’ to be addressed to the 
authorities of any country where systemic threats have been identified, and the non-
automatic recourse to Article 7 TEU should the recalcitrant Member State fail to comply, 
further increases the likelihood of protracted discussions and ineffective outcomes.  
 
4. The Council’s annual rule of law dialogue process  
 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings identified above, the Commission should be 
commended for taking compliance with EU values seriously. The emphasis on the rule of 
law, while at first perhaps surprising considering the other values mentioned in Article 2 
TEU, is convincingly justified on the ground that respect for the rule of law is a 
prerequisite for the protection of all other fundamental values upon which the EU is 
founded. The Commission’s prominent role in this context is also logical considering its 
well-established role as Guardian of the EU Treaties. The case for allowing an early 
intervention of the Commission in cases of systemic threats to the rule of law in any 
Member State is, in our view, compelling. However, the proposed framework may be seen 
as excessively ‘soft’ in nature. Not that it would be necessarily positive to transform the 
EU into a fully-fledged militant democracy as first suggested in the 1950s,89 but as noted 
above, it is highly unlikely that a confidential dialogue coupled with the possibility of 
adopting non-binding recommendations could enable the EU to successfully address the 
current phenomenon of ‘rule of law backsliding’, which is affecting a number of EU 
Member States, with exhibit A being Hungary. These weak features, however, did not stop 
the Council from attempting to ‘kill off’ the Commission’s new rule of law framework. 
Indeed, rather then supporting the Commission’s initiative, the Council decided instead to 
establish an annual rule of law ‘dialogue among all Member States within the Council’, 
based ‘on the principles of objectivity, non discrimination and equal treatment of all 
Member States’ and to be ‘conducted on a non partisan and evidence-based approach’.90 
The Council’s not so disguised attempt to pre-empt any activation of the Commission’s 
                                                 
89 While this is relatively unknown, the possibility of European intervention in a situation of systemic threat 
to the democratic and liberal constitutional order of a Member State is not an entirely new debate. Indeed, the 
European Political Community Treaty of 1953, which however never entered into force, provided for the 
rather extraordinary possibility of European intervention to maintain ‘constitutional order and democratic 
institutions’ within the territory of a Member State. See G. de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The EU as a 
Global Human Rights Actor’, 105 AJIL (2011) 649. 
90 Council of the EU, press release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 16 
December 2014, pp. 20-21.  
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pre-Article 7 procedure is hardly surprising considering the reluctance and unease of 
several national governments at the idea of giving to the Commission, or any new EU 
supranational body for that matter, the power to look into rule of law issues beyond the 
areas governed by EU law.91  
From a legal point of view, yet without explicitly stating as much, the Council’s 
dialogue proposal seems to reflect the view that the Commission’s pre-Article 7 procedure 
is not compatible with the principle of conferred competences92 as well as the Treaty 
provision providing for the respect of national identities of Member States inherent in their 
fundamental political and constitutional structures.93 As noted above, we believe these 
arguments to be based on a superficial and selective reading of the EU Treaties. The 
Council’s understanding of Article 7 TEU also proved at times to be quite confused: It is 
for instance incorrect to hold that ‘the rule of law applies as a value of the EU in the areas 
in which the EU has competence and EU monitoring mechanisms are possible to this 
extent.’94 On the contrary, it is well established that the raison d’être of Article 7 TEU is to 
enable the EU to remedy breaches of EU values in areas which are not connected to the 
exercise of an EU power or more generally, which fall outside the scope of EU law. The 
EU Commission should therefore be commended for confirming that its rule of law 
framework adopted in March 2014 remains in place and that it can be activated at any 
time, despite the negative opinion of the Council’s legal service previously cited.95 
This is not to say that the Commission’s new procedure does not suffer from a 
number of flaws. By comparison, however, the Council’s rule of law dialogue looks 
anaemic and goes nowhere near enough to what is required to address the challenges 
highlighted in this paper. For instance, the Council calls for an evidence-based approach 
but what does this mean in practice and is there anyone to argue in favour of an evidence 
free-based approach? Similarly, the dialogue is supposed to take place in the Council and 
be prepared by the COREPER, ‘following an inclusive approach’96 but one is again left 
wondering about what would this exactly entail in practice. More fundamentally, the 
Council is seeking to use a soft mechanism, which has been regularly criticised for its 
ineffective nature in the context of its use with non-EU countries. One may for instance 
refer to the multiple ‘human rights dialogues’, which the EU has set up with third countries 
to promote its values abroad. The EU’s infatuation for this discursive method has however 
been rightly questioned, as evidence of substantial and concrete achievements is thin on the 
ground.97  
It is therefore tempting to conclude that the Council has only been looking for a 
‘façade of action’,98 by rejecting any solution, even the most modest ones such as a peer-
review mechanism, which would have led to an actual examination of EU countries’ 
adherence to EU values. Two potential explanations come to mind: The Council is either in 
                                                 
91 See e.g. UK Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU – EU 
Enlargement (December 2014), para. 2.116: ‘However the Government does not accept the need for a new 
EU rule of law framework applying to all Member States. There are already mechanisms in place to protect 
EU common values and a further EU mechanism would risk undermining the clear roles for the Council and 
the European Council in this area.’ 
92 Art. 5 TEU. 
93 Art. 4(2) TEU. 
94 Italian Presidency Note to the Council of the EU, Ensuring respect for the rule of law in the EU, Doc. 
15206/14, Brussels, 14 November 2014, para. 12. 
95 See V. Pop, ‘Hungary triggers rule of law ‘debates’ in EU Council, EUobserver, 20 November 2014. 
96 Council of the EU, press release no. 16936/14, supra n. 90, p. 21.  
97 European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the 
World 2009 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2010/2202(INI)), para. 157.  
98 To paraphrase K. Roth, ‘A Facade of Action: The Misuse of Dialogue and Cooperation with Rights 
Abusers’, in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011. Events of 2010 (Seven Stories Press 2011), p. 1.  
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denial about the internal challenges faced by the EU or no other compromise could be 
found within an institution which welcomes representatives of some national governments 
whose rule of law records are highly questionable, if not abysmal.99 It is, in any event, 
particularly ironic that the Council adopted its annual dialogue proposal on the same day it 
adopted conclusions on the enlargement process which contain multiple references to the 
central importance of the rule of law and the need for candidate countries to focus on and 
tackle related issues with determination, a determination which is however clearly lacking 
when it comes to the current EU Member States themselves.  
 
5. The way forward 
 
In the absence of any realistic prospect of getting the national governments of EU Member 
States to agree on a fundamental revision of how the EU Treaties organise the internal 
policing of EU values, we would encourage the European Parliament to endorse the 
Commission’s rule of law framework and lend its support to any additional reforms which 
could make the ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’ more workable and effective. This would in turn 
increase its ‘dissuasive’ potential, a dissuasive effect Article 7 TEU no longer has if it ever 
had it. A number of proposals could be made in this regard. It is submitted that the 
Commission should in particular undertake the following actions: 
 
(i) Clarify the concept of ‘systemic threat’ and its relationship with the closely 
linked but not identical notions of serious threats, systemic violations and 
systemic deficiencies;  
(ii) Adopt pre-defined triggering benchmarks;  
(iii) Commit itself to systematically investigating any Member State referred to it 
under the new pre-Article 7 procedure by the European Parliament, the FRA, 
the Venice Commission or any national government or parliament of any EU 
country;  
(iv) Justify any decision not to initiate a ‘rule of law dialogue’ when any of the 
bodies previously mentioned has referred a Member State to its attention;  
(v) Publish any ‘rule of law opinion’ it may adopt when the Commission is of the 
view that there is indeed a situation of systemic threat to the rule of law and any 
response received from the Member State under investigation; 
(vi) Commit itself to triggering Article 7 TEU in the situation where its rule of law 
recommendations are not satisfactorily implemented within the time limit set, 
which should never exceed a period of twelve months.  
(vii) Provided that it is indeed possible to work with the Council (when all of the 
evidence currently available points toward a Council primarily interested in 
paying lip service to the need to safeguard EU values), an inter-institutional 
                                                 
99 To give one example, the Latvian Presidency (first half of 2015) has done absolutely nothing to address the 
issue of national breaches of EU values. Indeed, the Presidency was rightly condemned by the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the European Parliament for refusing to participate in the 
parliamentary debate on the situation on Hungary at the European Parliament last May. Speaking for the 
Council Presidency, Latvian State Secretary for European Affairs Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica did welcome 
the Parliament’s concern for the ‘preservation of democratic values’, but as the Council had not discussed the 
situation in Hungary, she argued not to be ‘in a position to comment’: European Parliament News, ‘Views on 
Hungary, fundamental rights and EU values’, Press release 20150513IPR55481, 21 May 2015. One could be 
forgiven to think that Latvia’s questionable human rights record when it comes to ethnic discrimination may 
well explain their lack of urgency with respect to Hungary. On Latvia’s record regarding minority rights, see 
e.g. D. Kochenov, V. Poleshchuk and A. Dimitrovs, ‘Do Professional Linguistic Requirements 
Discriminate?’, 10 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2013), p. 137. 
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agreement should be negotiated to avoid any duplication of efforts and 
institutional inertia following the adoption of conflicting understandings of 
what EU institutions may do under the EU Treaties.  
 
In parallel or indeed, regardless of the lack of consensus amongst national governments on 
the Commission’s rule of law framework, a number of additional, more practical reforms 
could also be implemented in the short term. It would be particularly helpful for the 
Commission to centralise and make public any rule of law related report published by EU 
and non-EU bodies on a dedicated page of its website, and seek to publish a rule of law 
ranking of EU countries which could reflect and bring together the many indexes and other 
scoreboards which have developed by governmental and non-governmental organisations 
over the years. Additional resources should also be allocated to ‘infringement teams’ and 
we would finally advise setting up special ‘infringement task forces’ with respect to any 
Member State whose compliance with Article 2 TEU is being questioned by any of the 
institutions and networks mentioned in the Commission’s Communication.  
Last but not least, the Commission would remain faithful to its raison d’être by 
lending its unqualified support to many of the useful suggestions made by the European 
Parliament these past few years. Let us briefly recall for instance that in 2012, it was the 
European Parliament which first suggested the monitoring of EU countries within the 
framework of a new ‘fundamental rights policy cycle’, which would involve every year 
‘the various fundamental rights actors within the EU structure’, i.e., EU institutions, the 
FRA and EU Member States, with joint measures and events to be organised with NGOs, 
citizens and national parliaments.100 The enhancement of the mandate of the FRA, with the 
view of enabling it to conduct regular monitoring of Member States’ compliance with 
Article 2 TEU, has also been regularly called for.101 In 2014, the European Parliament 
went further and called for the urgent establishment of a ‘new Copenhagen mechanism’ 
with the aim of ensuring that EU values as well as the fundamental rights laid down in the 
EU Charter ‘are respected, protected and promoted.’102 It was further suggested that this 
mechanism should complement the policy cycle on the application of Article 2 TEU in the 
individual EU Member States mentioned above. A ‘Copenhagen commission’, to be 
composed of independent high-level experts on fundamental rights, was also suggested.  
Most recently, the Liberal group in the European Parliament (ALDE) made a 
welcome contribution to the debate by putting forward an ‘EU Democratic Governance 
Pact’ modelled on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for the Euro area,103 which, 
considering the SGP’s poor record when it comes to sanctioning countries having breached 
its terms, may perhaps not be the best model to follow. In any event, rightly noting that the 
EU cannot be credible or have moral authority if it is unable to uphold its own standards 
‘at home’, the proposal put forward by ALDE contains a useful set of suggestions, most of 
which would having the additional advantage of requiring legislative but not Treaty 
change. One may for instance mention the idea of a European Scoreboard for Democracy, 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. This new monitoring tool would regularly measure 
concrete adherence to EU’s values on the basis of a series of indicators developed and 
                                                 
100 European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2012 on the situation of fundamental rights in the 
European Union (2010 - 2011) (2011/2069(INI)), para. 20. 
101 Ibid., para. 44.  
102 European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental rights in the 
European Union (2012) (2013/2078(INI)), para. 8(o). 
103 ALDE Initiative Outline, The EU Democratic Governance Pact. Upholding the Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights (13 January 2015). The full text of the proposed pact is available at: 
<http://www.alde.eu/documents/publications>.  
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measures by the FRA, within the framework of a new ‘European Semester’104 modelled on 
the existing mechanism that has been developed to measure economic governance in the 
EU. A number of valuable proposals to amend the European Treaties have also been made: 
(i) the creation of a new judicial remedy which would allow the Commission to bring an 
enforcement action against any relevant EU country on the sole basis of Article 2 TEU; (ii) 
a revision of the text of Article 7 TEU with lower voting thresholds and a set of clearer and 
wider range of penalties; (iii) the inclusion of a reference to the FRA in the Treaties, to 
make it possible to amend the Agency’s founding regulation not by unanimity as is 
currently the case but via the ordinary legislative procedure; and (iv), to offer each national 
parliament the right to refer a draft national law to the Court of Justice for an opinion on its 
compliance with the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. We fully support 




This article first submitted that the Commission was correct when it noted in its rule of law 
Communication from March 2014 that it lacked effective enforcement instruments when it 
came to monitoring and eventually sanctioning individual EU countries’ adherence to EU 
values. It was further submitted that given the overwhelming level of political, legal and 
economic interdependence between the EU Member States, the principles of mutual trust 
and mutual recognition of judgments which underlie the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice as a whole, the Commission has fulfilled its duty as Guardian of the Treaties by 
putting forward a new framework that would make Article 2 TEU more operational in 
practice. What has been described as a ‘pre-Article 7 TEU procedure’ also offers a number 
of positive features: it provides a satisfactory and workable definition of the rule of law 
and partially addresses the innate limitations of Article 7 TEU. It is however unlikely to 
effectively address the diagnosis it aimed to remedy mostly because of the soft and 
diplomatic nature of the procedure adopted by the Commission. In other words, one may 
reasonably expect any ideologically illiberal national government to misuse the new 
procedure to delay the possible recourse to the parts of Article 7 TEU that bite. Thus, 
instead of being solved, the problem of non-compliance with the EU values laid down in 
Article 2 TEU could even be exacerbated as a result.  
Notwithstanding its doubtful effectiveness and the Commission’s questionable 
resolve in making use of its rule of law framework, the Commission’s solution is far more 
preferable to the Council’s alternative answer to organise an annual rule of law dialogue, 
which demonstrates the Council’s continuing preference for rhetoric over action. As for the 
arguments raised against the Commission’s pre-Article 7 procedure, and in particular the 
allegation that the Commission in doing so breached the principle of conferred powers, 
they are not persuasive. Any criticism coming from an institution such as the Council 
which has proved clearly unable to confront its members’ obvious failings when it comes 
to respect with EU values should be taken with a pinch of salt. This is not to say that the 
Commission itself should be spared from any criticism in this regard. Indeed, while we 
wholeheartedly welcome Frans Timmermans’ clarification that ‘there is no such thing as 
an illiberal democracy’ and his renewed commitment ‘to use the [pre-Article 7 TEU] 
Framework’105 should the situation in any Member State require it, the time has come for 
                                                 
104 ‘European Semester’ is the name given to the EU’s annual economic policy coordination process. Within 
this framework the Commission can adopt country-specific recommendations with the view of boosting 
growth and jobs.  
105 F. Timmermans, ‘EU framework for democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights’, Speech to the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015. 
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the Commissioner in charge of the Rule of Law to stop talking the talk and start walking 
the walk.  
 
 
 
 
